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| Current (November 2021) political and military control in ongoing Yemeni Civil War |
The Yemen Civil War is a multilateral civil war that began in late 2014. The conflict involves the Yemeni government, led by President Abdrabbuh Manner Heidi, and the Houthi-led "Popular Committees" who are fighting for control of Yemen. Since the beginning of the war, over 10,000 people have been killed and 3 million displaced.
On October 8th 2015, Saudi Arabia began airstrikes on Yemen to stop South rebels from taking power. However, with no end in sight to this brutal civil war and continuing violence between different factions (including Al-Qaeda), it is difficult to predict when peace will be restored.
Impact on civilians
The Yemen Civil War is a multilateral civil war that began in late 2014. The most severe impacts on civilians are from the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes and blockade of ports, which have led to shortages of food, fuel and other basic goods. The United Nations estimates that over 3 million people might be internally displaced by the end of 2017.
The civil war in Yemen is one of the worst humanitarian crises we've seen in decades. More than 10,000 people have died since it began in late 2014 and 3 million people have been displaced from their homes as a result of intense fighting
Expected and Aspired
Some local and foreign predictions about the future of the current crisis in Yemen indicate the possibility of the country entering a fiasco (civil war); Due to the blockage of the horizon of the acceptable solution from the parties to the equation until the moment at least, and because it is a society, environment, culture and traditions in which there are multiple factors that collectively pose risks of civil war, including:
The existence of a strict and sharp sectarian mobilization
As is the case with the Houthi movement, which has become an armed sectarian force that dominates a geographical location and a tribal social support, which qualifies it to wage an armed war in order to impose its hegemony as a military and political force in some governorates in the north of the north, in Sa’ada and Al-Jawf for example. This may prompt the return of confrontations with tribal and sectarian forces that differ with the movement's agenda and ambitions. The writer had previously warned against the language of the sharp sectarian polarization that the movement uses in its literature towards the Sunni forces in Yemen with all its sects.
This war undoubtedly satisfies the desire of regional parties such as Iran, and it achieves, under the cloak of sectarian cover, the interests of tribes and families that have been excluded from influence, influence and wealth. Especially that sectarian polarization has begun to take an upward trend in light of the events in Bahrain and their regional repercussions.
In the event of a war of this kind, its flames will not stop in limited areas, but may even call for a regional dimension to it. Therefore, it is the duty of Yemenis to bury such projects by emphasizing public interests and peaceful coexistence in light of common values and principles, while the sectarian and intellectual dispute remains in the circle of controversy, dialogue and objective scientific debate. And if things get out of control and society enters a civil war, it will invoke the regional dimension and bring to mind the sectarian conflict in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 AD.
Including the social and political division between the components of the social and political fabric: what has become tangible is the absence of a consensual vision for resolving political, social, economic and cultural crises, even among the parties that met today on one demand for the fall of the regime. There are still voices calling for secession in the south, although they see it as tactically appropriate not to raise the slogans of secession until the fall of the regime. There is an effort by the Houthis - as we have said - to impose their presence as a fait accompli in Saada, Al-Jawf and some areas, and they are looking at the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, Sheikh Hamid Al-Ahmar and his brothers with suspicion and suspicion. In addition to this, al-Qaeda's attempt to occupy its foothold in Abyan and Shabwa in light of the chaos that could result from the fall of the regime. There are other divisions that will be revealed in the coming period, despite the attempts to simplify and jump, which some of them try to practice in the momentum of the popular revolution and to cover up some of its data in the arenas of change themselves.
Weakness of the central government and the beginning of the regime’s collapse
There are several governorates that got out of state control, intentionally or involuntarily. Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra governorates became independent with the joining of Major General Muhammad Ali Mohsen, commander of the eastern axis, to the revolution, and Shabwa and Abyan were deliberately left by the regime to be occupied by Al-Qaeda, and Marib and Al-Jawf - which were not under Basically state control - the government presence has become very weak, and Saada has fallen by the regime's decision to hand it over to the Houthis, in addition to other governorates that seemed to witness civil disobedience and popular resistance in a way that paralyzes the performance of government institutions.
Availability of weapons, methods of supply for armaments, and material and financial support for the various parties:
This creates an atmosphere conducive to igniting the spark of civil war in the event that private projects become the dominant logic in the political and social parties’ interactions with each other. Yemeni society is dominated by tribal fanaticism and zeal, and despite the peaceful image that dominates the public scene today, planning for future private projects is strongly present, accompanied by armaments and readiness for any transformation in the nature of the crisis. If we consider Yemen as a transit area for the arms trade, a market for buying and selling and a huge warehouse for it, then with these facts it represents a “ticking bomb”; Not in consideration of the threat that President Ali Saleh calls for an end in himself, but in consideration of the tangible facts of reality that the forces of the revolution have turned a blind eye to for an end in themselves.
Thus, we find that the civil war in Yemen can take several forms, including
Tribal disputes
Which have been burning during previous periods due to the existence of conflicts of revenge or interests. As is the case in the governorates of Al-Jawf, Ma'rib, Dhamar, Sana'a, and others.
Regional division
Where there is talk of two peoples, north and south, and calls for secession, even if based on the international dimension, as was the speech of former Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh and opposition figures abroad.
Narrow projects:
Such as Al-Qaeda's project to impose its hegemony on a patch of land and take it as a springboard for fighting and annexing the rest of the regions to what might be called the Islamic Emirate. Yemen may witness other narrow projects, such as the southern sultans, for example.
Class discrimination:
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| A pro-Saleh protest in Sanaa against the Saudi-led intervention, March 2016 |
Civil war and hidden strife:
Civil war is defined as the armed conflict that takes place within a society, a state, or a region, on ethnic, religious, sectarian, regional, or special projects, whether the state is part of this conflict or not. In international law, this term is applied to this form, and to any armed conflict between the state and some forces of society, or towards civil disobedience or armed rebellion directed against it. The prevailing academic definition is based on two criteria:
The First
That the opposing groups are from the same country, and that they fight for control of power, or for the sake of imposing a change on it, or for the sake of secession.
In general, the term is broad and includes many forms of conflict. The prevailing view in international law at the present time is based on the fact that the definition of civil war depends on the fighting being between armed civilians, and not between states or regular armed forces.
Civil war may take place under an existing government, or under the fall of the ruling regime in the geographical area, or the absence of control over parts of its lands. Its danger lies in the fact that it is not subject to the military (regular) rules of engagement; Rather, it is a war based on private projects and self-legitimacy, which is absent from the law and often out of control, and part of its goals is to target civilians from the other side for the purpose of genocide, or to intimidate them with the aim of driving them out of conflict areas. In all cases, the demographic structure and demographic balance are changing. To this end, it takes pictures of gang fighting (militias), street fighting, assassinations, ambushes, brutal torture and kidnappings.
Among the results of the civil war are
The absence or weakness of the state, the lack of security and public tranquility, the interruption of roads, the disruption of social and economic life activities, and the halting of the process of construction and development. Missionary, Western and intelligence bodies and organizations.
It also generates the phenomenon of mass displacement or asylum, civilian casualties of all ages and both sexes, the spread of violence, corruption and the smuggling trade, the violation of honor, the looting of wealth and private and public funds, and the spread of diseases and epidemics; The emergence of famine and lack of food, and the safe areas become the areas of depth, while the areas of contact become the areas of continuous burning.
Thus, we find that the civil war has dire consequences at the level of the conflicting forces, society and the state; In the case of Yemen, the country may be subject under the pretext of regional and international security to international trusteeship and foreign interference under international resolutions.
This talk about the results of the civil war is not hidden from Arab and Islamic societies that witnessed such a conflict. During the previous decades, the Arab region experienced several civil wars that represented different forms of the nature, sides and extent of the conflict. In all the examples, these wars had a negative impact, without there being any winners or losers. Examples of this are: the civil war in Lebanon and the civil war in the former Yemen Arab Republic (the War of the Central Regions), both in the eighties of the last century; the Algerian Civil War (after 1990), the Afghan Civil War (after the conquest of Kabul), and the Somali Civil War in the 1990s; And the civil war in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in 2003.
Duty of scholars and sages
Talking about the possibility of a civil war in Yemen is not a security, an intellectual luxury, or a conspiracy and discouragement, but it is a realism that should not be overlooked or skipped in favor of whims and aspirations that quickly evaporate under the flames of the community’s situation and the nature of customs, traditions, prevailing culture and special interests narrow and conflicting.
Despite the intersection of everyone’s demands in the Yemeni revolution on the necessity of overthrowing the regime, as it was the reason for employing and playing with differences and sects; However, the fading of demands and subsequent projects to overthrow the regime reflects the fact of incompatibility (as well as congruence) between the forces of change, especially with the reluctance of each party to talk about (the theft of the revolution) from other parties.
And politics for those who know it is not based on aspirations and aspirations, but on facts and real data, and if we acknowledge the existence of the Houthi movement and al-Qaeda and the calls reinforced by the movement for secession and the remnants of the forces of the current regime wishing to take revenge if change takes place, then we are talking about signs of an upcoming crisis that could develop if he neglected it. Scholars, wise men, and good people from the people of Yemen address its dimensions and remedy its causes.
Here is a set of suggested measures that sane Yemenis can take to preserve social cohesion, political unity and cultural identity,
First:
Drafting the next constitution in a good way that takes into account this difference by emphasizing common values and principles; While ensuring the legitimate rights of the people and their just demands in a balanced and permanent manner and in clear terms.
Second
All parties represented in the Yemeni arena (intellectual, political, and sectarian) sit at the dialogue table, bring their views closer, and formulate an agreed vision between the parties to issue and appeal to it.
Third
Abandoning narrow projects and special interests for the sake of uniting, meeting and stabilizing public peace, with competition on the ground through word and discourse, presenting programs and presenting projects to the public, while leaving freedom for people to evaluate and choose without coercion, debt buying, or intellectual, social or political terrorism.
Fourth:
Disarming all tribal, political and sectarian forces, forming a national army based on proportional representation for all Yemeni regions without discrimination, and defining its tasks to protect the country from any occupying foreign powers, with a stipulation that it will not interfere in a political, ideological or sectarian conflict as a popular institution neutral.
Fifth:
Re-drafting the structure of the state according to a federal system or local government with wide powers, allowing each local community to manage its affairs according to its vision and social nature without prejudice to the rights of the minority, whoever they are, and without departing from the cultural identity and social fence that unite the Yemeni people. Insisting on a central unity formula over which forces are wrestling between a minority and a majority, the north and the south, Islamic and non-Islamic, may plunge the country into complete chaos and civil war, as we have already mentioned.
These solutions may be considered by wise people in Yemen to be a way out for the future of Yemen before the forces of conspiracy and stalking hijack the popular revolution before it sees the light, as happened in the revolutions of September 26 and October 14, and the believer is not stung twice from a hole.