 |
| Silk Road |
Historically, Iran has always had a special place in the ranks of silk, the land where Marco Polo believed that he discovered the tombs of the three eastern holy kings mentioned in the Gospel of Matthew in the city of Saba, now Saveh in the southwest of Tehran. However, the first image of these trade arteries looks less like caravans than trains connected from China to Europe via a spiral route through Central Asia.
China's "New Silk Roads," officially called "One Belt and One Road" (BRI) by Beijing, include a series of maritime and rail routes with mostly financial investments to China's bilateral trade with Europe. to facilitate Since its official launch in 2013, the initiative has grown far beyond its initial framework to include an increasing number of countries, including in Africa and the Middle East. This project, which was initially limited to the development of infrastructure, now includes other sectors and the talk of "Digital Silk Road", "Innovation Silk Road", "Green Silk Road" Silk Road) etc.. is struck. Its overall aim, beyond the trade dimension, is to strengthen China's soft power, geopolitical weight and influence - especially financial or technological - beyond its borders.
The New Silk Roads are above all maritime communications with significant investments in strategic ports that facilitate the transportation of Chinese goods to European and intermediate markets. They are also China's channels for the supply of raw materials and other products it needs to continue its development. In this framework, Iran is of limited importance, except for the port of Chabahar, in the extreme southeast of the country, with an ideal location on the Gulf of Oman. which is an important passage for the transit of hydrocarbons from the producing countries of the Persian Gulf to foreign markets.
However, some classic "One Belt and One Road" (BRI) investments in roads and railways have been made in the country. The modernization of the Tehran-Mashhad line, the second largest city of Iran, located in the northeast, is the most obvious of them. Other significant investments have been made in other dimensions of the BRI: such as the Digital Silk Road with the 5G future deployment project, the Innovation Silk Road in the framework of cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Green Silk Road Road) with solar station projects in cooperation with Chinese state companies, etc...
 | ||
| The New Silk Roads | Source: Atlas of new routes, Courrier international, September-October 2018 |
A partnership of 25 years
As a result, the most important Chinese investments are made outside the formal BRI framework. In this regard, the 25-year strategic partnership, which was signed in March 2021 after years of negotiations in Tehran, only provides a formal framework for the investment of Iran's largest trading partner. The figures published by the press are only speculations about the potential of the agreement without knowing the projects that are announced within the framework of this agreement or whether it is only the finalization of the investments that were already started. The announcement of this agreement had more of a diplomatic effect than an economic one, and its target was the new American government. This shows that Iran has serious alternative economic partners in the West.
However, the limited dimension of BRI for Iran should not make us forget that this country is already part of the Eurasian regional development, far beyond China. Tehran wants to benefit from this and be an active actor. The Eurasian dimension as the axis of Iran's foreign policy is not new, but it gained more momentum with the establishment of BRI. Thus, the first important step was taken in 2013, the year of the launch of the new Silk Roads, when Kazakhstan hosted talks on Iran's nuclear power. In 2014, Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan railway projects started, in 2016, the first direct cargo train from China arrived in Iran in just fourteen days. After that, matters gained momentum, in 2018, the Caspian Sea Convention was signed after two decades of suspension, then in 2021, a series of Iranian diplomatic trips to Central Asia followed, followed by Tehran's official application for membership in the Union. announced the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). An institution that brings Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan together for cooperation.
This renewed diplomatic interest in the northern borders has been accompanied by investment in infrastructure by actors other than China. The North-South Trade Corridor (India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia) project, another long-dormant project, has been revived thanks to India's investments in Iran's Chabahar port. This project can be a very good alternative to the plan of Uzbekistan's access to Pakistan's ports through Afghanistan. The internal situation of Afghanistan has recently undergone profound changes and many are waiting for the improvement of conditions, especially in terms of security.
Bypassing US sanctions
Secondary US sanctions against Iran and the banking restrictions they impose remain a major barrier to trade, but they are not crippling. Conditions that make the use of alternative financial channels inevitable, which of course European companies do not accept. including the sale of financial licenses by Kazakhstan (1), including cryptocurrencies, the use of Swift Bank of Uzbekistan (2), which is about to be privatized, as well as its Russian equivalent, and soon, as officially announced, the use of e-yuan3 (3), etc. . Thus, Tehran is in a good position to benefit from the new silk roads, even indirectly.
The relationship with Kazakhstan is a clear example. As the largest economy in Central Asia, this country is an active partner of Iran. Only in 2020, the embassy of this country in Tehran organized more than fifty events to promote bilateral economic relations, which no European or even Arab country has been able to do. It should be noted - and this is significant - that trade between the two countries is truly bilateral. Several large Iranian companies in all sectors are based in Almaty, the largest city in Kazakhstan. This country, like some other countries before it, can become an important commercial hub for Iran.
Beyond the mere economic opportunities, the Islamic Republic pursues several goals in its policy related to the new Silk Roads: opening and developing - and providing security. For example, the Caspian Sea Convention in 2018 prevents any foreign military presence in this common space. During his tenure, Donald Trump was almost completely uninterested in Central Asia while applying the policy of maximum pressure against Iran. Tehran used this vacuum to strengthen its position and also to be accepted as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China-Russia Regional Economic and Security Cooperation Organization).
However, China pursues regional strategic goals that may differ from those of Iran. For example, its goal in the Persian Gulf, in the context of the expansion of the Silk Road, is to find new markets for investment and business development. It is also important for Beijing to provide energy security through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Finally, China's long-term goal is to stabilize its position in the region without directly challenging the hegemony claimed by the United States. In this regard, the Chinese plan to balance their trade relations with the Saudis and Iranians and avoid any convulsions that would anger the United States. Beijing needs both cheap Iranian oil - due to the lack of other customers due to US sanctions - and Arab support for the new Silk Roads. Hence, Beijing is happy to be able to help a regional power against its American rival, without too closely related to the same country that is sometimes seen as an enemy by its neighbors to the south. be Therefore, it adopts a far-sighted and balanced policy. If the competition between China and America moves eastward and Washington's relative disinterest in the Persian Gulf is confirmed, this direction can change.
Although Iran is a small player in the development program announced by Beijing, it can enjoy some direct benefits by attracting limited investments in sub-structures that are important to the Chinese partner. In addition, Tehran can hope to become an important player in the Eurasian region in the long run. The BRI creates new regional development conditions that Iran, disillusioned with Europe and the West and with limited partners in the south, wants to profit from commercially.
The developments of the next few months should be viewed with caution. The first quadrilateral summit (Iran, Uzbekistan, India, Afghanistan) on the joint use of Chabahar will be held in the fall of 2021. It should be seen if the summit will confirm India's point of view on a north-south corridor, as a railway network that will transport Indian goods to Europe through Iranian soil. Beyond predicting what will happen in the future, one thing is certain for now: the slow and deep movement described above will have an impact in the Middle East where Iran is the main actor. Looking to the north will not distract this country from its desire to be the main player in the south.
- This type of central bank license allows you to operate as a payment service provider, stock broker or cryptocurrency trading.
- The most extensive interbank communication system in the world, which facilitates sending information to American authorities.
- The first digital currency that was issued by the central bank of a major economic power and facilitated transactions outside the dollar and without Swift.